Voepass: understand the chain of responsibilities that led the PF to indict 16 people The Federal Police's final report on the crash of the Voepass plane, which killed 62 people in Vinhedo (SP) in 2024, points out that commander Danilo Romano was promoted without having the minimum experience required by the company itself and ended up "coapted" by management to omit breakdowns in exchange for a quick rise in the career ladder. According to testimony from commander Marcelo Mantovani, Romano arrived at Voepass after flying Airbus jets and took command of ATR aircraft without previous experience in the model. The company required at least 1,000 flight hours in ATR for promotion. The promotion was authorized during Rafael Gimenez Rodrigues' tenure as head of training. Another pilot interviewed by the PF, Luiz Cláudio de Almeida, stated that Romano himself said he had been promoted quickly because of a "relationship of friendship and favors in management". READ ALSO: From complaint to trial: the next steps after the PF indicts 16 for Voepass plane crash Who are those indicted for the air disaster Anac inspector witnessed failure of de-icing system on flight 11 months before the crash Victims' families plan collective action For the PF, the rapid rise made Romano more susceptible to internal pressure not to record technical problems. Pilot Paulo Eduardo Pereira dos Santos reported that newly promoted captains used to act like "pianists" in front of their bosses, while more experienced professionals had more confidence in refusing flights and demanding records of breakdowns. "The coaptation of commander ROMANO to the vested interests of management, in not reporting failures, under the advantage of a quick promotion, is one of the causes of the production of the concrete danger, since the aforementioned crew member did not register the failures in the de-ice system. He was also unable to prevent the aggravating result (air accident) due to his inexperience with that type of aircraft, as described in the statements collected", describes the PF report. Danilo Santos Romano, commander of the VoePass plane that crashed in Vinhedo (SP) Reproduction Strict pilots were left aside Commander Luiz Cláudio de Almeida told the PF that he was hired in 2019 with experience in ATR, but ended up being kept as a co-pilot. According to him, colleagues linked to management said that more rigorous pilots were not promoted because they could "stop planes" by following technical rules to the letter, which would affect the company's operations. Almeida also stated that he had witnessed requests for technical problems not to be recorded in the logbook, preventing aircraft from being taken out of operation. On one of the flights with Danilo Romano, Almeida reported a serious engine problem. According to him, Romano initially did not recognize the breakdown and resisted reporting it. Almeida said he threatened to disembark if the failure was not reported. After other conflicts, Almeida asked not to fly with Romano anymore, alleging conduct that he considered unsafe. The management removed them both from the same scale. In Almeida's place, co-pilot Humberto de Campos began flying with Romano, who was later assigned to flight 2283 and died in the accident. Humberto Alencar, Voepass co-pilot, killed in plane crash in Vinhedo Personal file Inexperience affected reaction to ice The PF also relates Romano's little experience in the ATR to the way the crew reacted to the accumulation of ice on flight 2283. Marcelo Mantovani explained that pilots coming from Airbus jets were used to another type of operation. According to him, in ATR, the risk of ice formation requires constant attention and quick reaction. In the pilot's opinion, Romano did not yet have this experience incorporated and, therefore, did not immediately begin a descent when the ice began to form. The PF concluded that, although Romano had formal qualifications and training, the lack of practical experience in the model played a role in the accident. In a statement, Voepass stated that it has always followed the safety, maintenance and training protocols provided by Anac. The company also said that the pilots were trained for icing situations and that the flight 2283 crew was qualified and duly certified. Read the full position below. Plane with 62 people on board crashed into a condominium of houses in Vinhedo, in the interior of SP. No one survived Miguel Schincariol/AFP Remember the accident The accident happened on August 9, 2024. The ATR 72-500, registration PS-VPB, was flying between Cascavel (PR) and Guarulhos International Airport (SP) when it crashed in the backyard of a house in a condominium in Vinhedo (SP). The 62 people on board, including 58 passengers and four crew, died. No resident of the affected residence was injured. It was the most serious accident in Brazilian aviation since the TAM flight disaster in 2007. Voepass accident: PF concludes criminal investigation and indicts 16 for plane crash What Voepass says "VOEPASS informs that operational safety has always been its priority. Over more than 30 years of operation in Brazilian aviation, the company has strictly adopted all safety, maintenance and crew training protocols provided for by the National Civil Aviation Agency (Anac). The company reinforces that its operations have always been guided by the highest aviation safety standards, with, since 2012, the IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit) certification, granted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to companies approved in a rigorous international operational safety audit. Pilot training included procedures for dealing with icing conditions, including measures such as changes in altitude and speed, in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer's guidelines and applicable operational protocols. to strictly comply with these procedures, according to each operational scenario.